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Abstract   This paper analyzes the optimal management of the Northern Atlan-
tic bluefin tuna, both eastern and western stocks. The analysis is based on a
deterministic multi-gear and age-structured bioeconomic model. In order to as-
sess the importance of the gear structure in this fishery, the model is optimized
in two scenarios. In the first, the strategies are restricted to the gear mix of the
base year, whereas in the second, the optimal gear mix is estimated. For both
scenarios, optimal constant strategies are determined. The corresponding opti-
mal use is then compared with an open-access scenario. Also, optimal
non-constant strategies are explored. As expected, the gear structure of the fish-
ery proved to be highly relevant in the optimal payoffs. In particular, the
unrestricted strategies yield rents substantially higher than the restricted ones.
Also, the optimal management of the bluefin tuna fishery, in both the East and
West Atlantic, would imply significant reallocation of the gear shares.
Key words   Bioeconomic model, bluefin tuna, open-access, optimal management.
Introduction
The management of highly migratory species has become one of the most challeng-
ing issues in the management of ocean fishery resources (Munro 1999). This paper
studies one of these species, the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna. The overall fishery
is comprised of a number of sub-fisheries, typically defined geographically and by
fleet/gear, and targeting different age classes, with different efficiency and economic
value. For that purpose, a multi-gear and age-structured bioeconomic model is de-
veloped. Through this approach, the impact of each gear in stock dynamics, as well
as their inter-relationships, is accounted for in the analysis of the optimal manage-
ment of this species.
During the 1990s, bioeconomic models became an important tool in the applied
study of the optimal management of fishing resources (Sylvia and Enriquez 1994;
Kennedy 1992; Placenti, Rizzo, and Spagnollo 1992). In particular, the use of mod-
els disaggregated by age and gear (Thunberg, Helser, and Mayo 1998), as well as
Pedro Pintassilgo is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Economics, Universidade do Algarve, Cam-
pus Gambelas 8000-117, Faro, Portugal, email: ppintas@ualg.pt. Clara Costa Duarte is an associate pro-
fessor in the Faculty of Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estevão Pinto 1000, Lisboa,
Portugal, email: mcduarte@fe.unl.pt.
This paper is part of the project PL96.1778, “The Management of High Seas Fisheries,” financed by
the European Commission. This document does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission of
the European Communities and in no case anticipates the Commission’s position in this domain.Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte 48
multi-species and multi-location models (Placenti, Rizzo, and Spagnollo 1992) has
become increasingly important. One of the main strengths of these models is that
they can be used to study different age and gear allocation patterns. Thunberg,
Helser, and Mayo (1998) used a disaggregated model to evaluate the economic im-
plications of tradeoffs between alternative age-specific selection patterns in the U.S.
Atlantic silver hake fishery. One of their main conclusions was that shifting fishing
pressure to younger classes results in short-run gains that are not sustainable. Re-
garding tuna fisheries, studies by Campbell and Nicholl (1995) and Campbell (1999)
suggest that the optimal management of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central
Pacific may require significant reallocations of fishing effort between the different
gears. Geen and Nayar (1988) also emphasize the importance of fleet structure in
the Southern bluefin tuna fishery.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the optimal management of the Northern At-
lantic bluefin tuna through optimization of the bioeconomic model. The optimal man-
agement strategies are considered to be those that maximize total net present value of
profits (TNPV). They are estimated in two alternative scenarios. The first considers that
the gears maintain their relative position, as in the base year (1995), and the other con-
siders that the gear structure is unrestricted. For both scenarios, constant strategies were
optimized: constant total allowable catch (TAC) and constant fishing effort. In addition,
the optimal use under non-constant strategies is also explored. The optimal management
strategies are compared with open-access simulation outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. First, a brief description of the fishery and
the management system is provided. Second, the bioeconomic model is defined —
this includes the model structure, the estimation of the model parameters, and a refer-
ence to sensitivity and retrospective analysis. Third, the optimization analysis is dis-
cussed. Fourth, the optimal constant management strategies are presented for the East
Atlantic and for the West Atlantic. Fifth, the analysis of the optimal management is
extended to non-constant strategies. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented.
The Fishery1
The Northern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna is an oceanic pelagic and is
the largest and most valued of the Atlantic tunas.
Although this species can be found in all the North Atlantic waters, there are
two different stocks. In fact, there are two major spawning areas, and each stock
tends to migrate within its own area. In the West Atlantic, the spawning area is lo-
cated in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Florida Straits. In the East Atlantic, the
spawning area is located in the Mediterranean around the Balearic Islands and the
Southern Tyrrhenian Sea. According to the migration patterns, bluefin tuna is dis-
tributed in the west, from Brazil to Labrador; in the east, from the Canary Islands to
Norway; in the North Sea; in all of the Mediterranean and in the Southern Black
Sea. Occasionally, it reaches Iceland and Murmansk. Also, like many other tunas,
bluefin tend to be found in schools of similar-sized individuals.
The total catch of Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna has shown an increasing trend
since the early 1970s, reaching a maximum of 48,514 metric tons (MT) in 1996
(ICCAT 1998). This increasing trend is mainly due to increased catches in the East
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The western catches decreased significantly in 1982
and stabilized at around 2,000 MT thereafter.
The Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery is rather complex, as it is harvested
1 For a more detailed description of this fishery see Costa Duarte, Brasão, and Pintassilgo (1998).Optimal Management of the Bluefin Tuna 49
by a variety of vessel types and fishing gears operating out of many countries. Dif-
ferent fishing gears target different quality and size of bluefin, which have different
market values. The prices for large size, high-quality specimens are significantly
higher than the prices for all others.
The most important fishing gears in the East Atlantic are the purse seine, trap,
baitboat, and longline. In the West Atlantic, the prevailing gears are the purse seine,
longline, and rod and reel. These gears, and their efficiency, differ according to the
location of the fishery.
The importance of each gear, as well as the distribution of the different gears in
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, has changed over time. One of the most impor-
tant changes has been the reallocation of the longline fishery, mainly Japanese, from
the West to the East Atlantic. The distribution of the main fisheries since 1970 is
shown in figure 1.
The management of the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna falls under the aegis of
the International Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
This organization was established in 1969 through the International Convention for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. This Convention attributed two primary func-
tions to the ICCAT, “… scientific assessment of Atlantic tuna and tuna-like
fishes…” (Art. IV) and giving “…recommendations, applicable to tuna and tuna-like
species … that will permit the maximum sustainable catch …” ( Art. VIII).
In 1974, ICCAT recommended limiting bluefin tuna fishing mortality to recent lev-
els in the entire Atlantic and Mediterranean. This recommendation entered into force in
1975, and many recommendations and resolutions have been adopted by ICCAT regard-
ing the conservation and management of the bluefin tuna thereafter. Present regulations
(ICCAT 1998), for both East and Western stocks, range from catch limits (distributed in
Figure 1. North Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Main Fisheries
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quotas for member countries) and prohibition of juvenile landings, to closing seasons
(no longlining in the Mediterranean in June-July by vessels of more than 24 meters).
Despite the wide range of regulations, enforcement in the East Atlantic has al-
ways been ineffective. This is due, in great part, to the high number of participants
in the fishery, both members and non-members of the ICCAT. Since 1982, regulation
of the West stock has been successful in restricting catches and stabilizing stock, al-
though both at very low levels.
According to the most recent stock assessment (ICCAT 1998), both the eastern
and western stocks are severely depleted. One of the core factors behind this is the
high price of bluefin on the Japanese market. This market has a strong and selective
demand for large, high-quality specimens, for which it is virtually the only con-
sumer. The depletion of the Southern bluefin tuna stock in the Pacific Ocean is an-
other factor behind the pressure on the northern Atlantic bluefin tuna stocks (Geen
and Nayar 1988). The increase in prices also creates a strong incentive to spend a
significant part of the fishery rent on technological improvements, in order to in-
crease the catches.2
The Model
In this section, the bioeconomic model used in the simulation and optimization
analysis is explained.
The core aim of a bioeconomic model is to represent the dynamic inter-relation-
ship between the economic and biological variables. The structure of this model
emerged from the combined analysis of the theoretical modeling of fisheries and the
data available to pursue it, and severe data constraints were clearly a determining
point in this study. As Rodgers (1998) suggests, there is only one approach when
this problem arises, “… build the model and determine intuitively those coefficients
that cannot be estimated for lack of data. It is then possible to test the sensitivity of
the objective function to them. Then it is possible to demonstrate the potential of the
model…” This approach was adopted when no other was available. Fortunately, the
dynamics of the main variables are strongly supported by the sensitivity and retro-
spective analysis of the model (Brasão, Pintassilgo, and Costa Duarte 1999).
Model Structure
The bioeconomic model is composed of two sub-models, the biological and the eco-
nomic, linked by the gear catch functions. The glossary of symbols is presented in
table A1, and the model equations are presented in the appendix.
Biological Sub-model
The biological part consists of an age-structured, multi-gear and discrete time model
[equations (A1) to (A11)], which was developed for the Northern Atlantic bluefin
tuna fishery in Kirkwood and Barry (1997). An interesting aspect of this model is
that a system of S (number of gears) non-linear and simultaneous equations (A11) is
2 This is confirmed by the reports of the ICCAT, which state that recently there has been a strong invest-
ment in technological improvement in fishing gear. Specifically, there have been investments in instru-
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solved for each time period. The solution of this system is the vector of fishing mor-
talities at maximum selectivity, which is used to compute the instantaneous fishing
mortalities [equations (A7) and (A8)].
Harvest Function
The link between the biological and economic components of a bioeconomic model
is established through equalizing equation (A11) to equation (A12), a Cobb Douglas
catch function, by gear.3 This type of production function is frequently used for
schooling species (Kennedy 1992; Bjørndal 1988), because in this case the usual as-
sumption, where catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is proportional to stock, is not real-
istic (Conrad and Clark 1987). Also, equation (A12) relates total catch by gear to a
measure of effort that can be evaluated in economic terms.
Economic Sub-model
Regarding the revenue equation (A13), an average price by gear was used. Although
it is known that prices vary significantly with age, this assumption is not a very
strong one — as the selectivity coefficients by gear [equation (A7)] are considered
to be constant during the forecasting period. This assumption introduces some sta-
bility on the age distribution of the various gears’ catches. The option for average
prices by gear, instead of prices by gear and age classes, was due to the lack of suf-
ficient age-disaggregated price data. In addition, prices are also assumed to be time
invariant. Although some authors have recognized the importance of incorporating
price-quantity relationships (Thunberg, Helser, and Mayo 1998; Kennedy 1999),
many others assume constant prices when the fishery is only a small fraction of the
market (Yew and Heaps 1996; Amundsen, Bjørndal, and Conrad 1995). In the case
of the bluefin tuna fishery, although price clearly depends on supply, it also depends
on the Southern bluefin tuna supply, and to a smaller extent, on the supply of other
tunas. As there are other important determinants in the price, the assumption of con-
stant price was adopted. By incorporating a negative price-quantity relationship, the
short-run profitability would decrease in the open-access and increase in the regu-
lated scenarios. In the former, the price would decrease due to the increase in
catches. In the latter, the opposite would occur. So, in the short-run, constant prices
can be viewed as an extreme case, where the difference of economic gains between
regulation and open-access is at a minimum.
The cost function represented by equation (A14) is a general aggregate function,
where total cost by gear is a linear combination of revenue and effort level. The in-
clusion of revenue is due to the common practice in fisheries, in which the crew receives
a share of the results. As we did not model at the vessel level, and as most fleets also
pursue significant activities targeting other species, fixed costs were not considered
(Thunberg, Helser, and Mayo 1998; Amundsen, Bjørndal, and Conrad 1995).
The gear profit function, given by equation (A15), is calculated for each time
period as the difference between revenue and cost. For each gear, the sum of the dis-
counted profits, within a time horizon, yields its net present value (NPV). Equation
(A16) represents the TNPV of overall fishery profits.
3 The lack of data at boat level led us to model the dynamics at gear level (as in Thunberg, Helser, and
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Open-Access Dynamics and Exit Condition
The entry-exit behavior of vessels is not specifically modeled, but is implicit in the
dynamics of the aggregate effort by gear.
In this paper, the open-access dynamics were modeled assuming that effort var-
ies with profits according to the relationship presented in equation (A17). The key
determinant of the dynamics, in the short-run, is the existence or absence of profits
and not its magnitude, as it is assumed that there are natural constraints to effort
changes. A profit interval where there are no effort adjustments was also considered
in order to avoid effort movements for profits, or losses, not significantly different
from zero. As fleets, like other economic agents, tend to leave an activity whenever
short-run losses are too high, an exiting condition [equation (A18)] was introduced.
Model Parameters
The values of the parameters used in the simulation and optimization of the model
are presented in tables 1 and 2.
Biological Sub-model
All the biological parameters were estimated by Kirkwood and Barry (1997),4 using
mainly ICCAT’s data (ICCAT 1996b). In particular, several functional forms were
tested for the recruitment relationship [equation (A2)], and these authors recom-
mended a bilinear recruitment function.
Production Function
In most applied studies of schooling species using constant elasticity production
functions, the estimates of catch-effort elasticity are very close to 1, and the catch-
stock elasticity is very low. For the Northern anchovy fishery, Opsomer and Conrad
(1994) present a catch-stock elasticity equal to 0.4, while for the minke whale
(Amundsen, Bjørndal, and Conrad 1995) and herring (Bjørndal 1988), the estimate
is not significantly different from zero.
Due to data limitations, econometric estimation was not possible in this study.
Therefore, we used values within the range of the parameters published in the litera-
ture on schooling species. A sensitivity and retrospective analysis was performed in
order to evaluate the impact on the dynamics of the model.
In the bluefin tuna fishery, some gears use very advanced methods of detection
(longline, purse seine, bait boat, and rod and reel). For these gears, in which catches
do not depend greatly upon the stock, a low catch-stock elasticity (0.2) was used.
For traditional gears (trap and the remainder category), which are considered to be
more stock dependent, a higher value (0.8) was used.
The effort levels considered for the base year were computed by extrapolation
from ICCAT samples (ICCAT 1996a) and are presented in table 1.
The parameters qj,s define scales on the production functions. As econometric
estimation was not possible, we adopted the implicit scale for the base year (1995).
4 In the manuscript, “Specifications of a Biological and Catch Prediction Model for the Northern Bluefin
Tuna” (1997), Kirkwood and Berry present all the biological data and estimations needed to run the model.Optimal Management of the Bluefin Tuna 53
Table 1
Production Function Parameters and Levels of Effort for 1995
East Atlantic West Atlantic
Gears q Effort Units q Effort Units
Longline 32.0369 9,294 Fishing days 48.5422 527 Fishing days
Purse seine 193.9020 2,114 Fishing days 60.3435 145 Days at sea
Trap 0.0003 2,066 Trap days _ _ _
Bait boat 33.3941 2,274 Fishing days _ _ _
Rod & reel _ _ _ 0.4905 74,429 Fishing hours
Remainder 0.0001 21,510 Days at sea 0.0026 156 Fishing days
The values were computed by solving the production function and applying the base
year values for catches (ICCAT 1996b), the biomass (Kirkwood and Barry 1997),
and total effort.
Despite the simplicity of the assumptions, the constant elasticity production
function is able to provide the model with reasonable forecasting and retrospective
power.
Economic Parameters
Economic data for the bluefin tuna fishery is sparse and scattered throughout many
sources. Data from different sources were collected, and the most consistent were
selected for estimating the model parameters.
Prices
The most consistent price database of bluefin tuna is the one used by the Japan Cus-
toms House (1997). Average prices by gear were computed based mainly on this da-
tabase. The values used take into account information on the gear/country structure
and the proportions that go to the local market and the Japanese market. The se-
lected average prices are presented in table 2.
Table 2
Economic Parameters of the Model
East Atlantic West Atlantic
Gears Prices Margin wg Unit Prices Margin wg Unit
(USD/kg) (%) of Effort (USD/kg) (%) of Effort
Longline 17 10 14,102 Fishing days 17 5 15,265 Fishing days
Purse seine 9 10 45,185* Fishing days 18 5 20,092 Days at sea
Trap 25 0 15,738 Trap days — — — —
Bait boat 5 5 4,638 Days at sea — — — —
Rod and reel — — — 18 5 163 Fishing hours
Remainder 17 0 2,408 Days at sea 20 5 22,417 Fishing days
Note: * For the PS, in the East Atlantic, one fishing day corresponds to more than three days at sea.Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte 54
A 4% rate of discount was used to evaluate the NPV of each sub-fishery during
the forecasting period. This value was considered reasonable according to other ap-
plied studies using similar investment horizons, such as the Final Environmental Im-
pact Statement for the Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (U.S. Department of Com-
merce 1995), in which a 3.6% discount rate is used.
Costs
Published cost data for the bluefin tuna fishery is almost nonexistent. The revenue
coefficient in the cost function was assumed to be 0.3 for all gears in both the East
and West Atlantic, as it approximates the empirical crew shares. The parameter asso-
ciated with effort was computed assuming that profits for the base year (1995) were
a percentile margin of the revenues. These coefficients were computed assuming
that, at present, some gears are more profitable than others and so have higher mar-
gins. The margins, as well as the effort coefficients on the cost function, are pre-
sented in table 2.
The few available cost data, namely for longline (East and West Atlantic) and
purse seine (West Atlantic), support the values used.
Open-Access Dynamics and Exit Condition
It was assumed that a level of profit (or loss) equal to or smaller than 10 times the
cost per unit of effort will not induce changes in effort.
The effort adjustment parameters, β j,s, were determined based on the evolution
of estimated fishing effort for the most recent years. Therefore, different values for
different gears were used accordingly. For the East Atlantic {0.25, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2,
0.01} were used for longline, purse seine, trap, bait boat, and remainder, respec-
tively, whereas for the West Atlantic {0.1} was assumed for all gears.
Regarding the exit condition, equation (A18), a reasonably high value was used
for the parameter hj,s (0.5 for all gears). Thus, any fishing gear in which the cost is
higher than revenues by more than 50% exits the fishery.
Simulations use a time horizon of 25 years, which was considered a reasonable
period. This horizon ensures, for most simulation scenarios, a good tradeoff between
computation time and stock stabilization.
Sensitivity and Retrospective Analysis
In Brasão, Pintassilgo, and Costa Duarte (1999), the results of the sensitivity analy-
sis of the parameters is presented in more detail, for both the optimization and open-
access scenarios. In particular, the following parameters were tested: prices, catch-
stock elasticity used in the production function, profit margins considered for the
base year, and effort adjustment.
In the optimization of the fixed gear structure case, for both East and West At-
lantic, the same study concludes that, in general, the optimal constant strategies are
not sensitive to the parameter values. However, for some parameters, the impact on
the TNPV is significant. This also occurs in the open-access simulations. Based on
these results, it can be concluded that the optimal values of the decision variables
are not very sensitive to the values of the parameters, but the same does not apply to
the overall value of the fishery.
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evaluate the robustness of a forecasting model. It consists of going back in the
sample period and forecasting using the parameters of the original model. Only the
information available at the starting period5 is used, and the dynamics of the model cor-
respond to the open-access scenario, in which fishing effort changes according to profit-
ability. The differences between the forecasts within the sample and the real data are
a good indicator of the model’s power to capture the dynamics of the system.
The results of this analysis show that for the East stock, the model is able to
capture the dynamics of the catches in the 1990s and, in particular, their increasing
trend (figure 2). Total catches shifted from a stable trend in the second half of the
1980s, to a sharp increase in the 1990s. One key factor behind this change was the
access to the Japanese market and the resulting increase in prices. In the study, it is
shown that by allowing for lower prices in the 1980s, the model is also able to pre-
dict the trend of catches since the early 1980s.
For the West Atlantic, the open-access scenario does not represent the dynamics
of the catches in recent years, as after 1982 the regulations were successful in re-
stricting catches and stabilizing stock, although at a very low level.
Optimization Analysis
The optimal management strategies are estimated by determining the decision vari-
ables that maximize total payoff (TNPV) within the time horizon of the model, sub-
ject to the model constraints.
The optimal use of the fishery is computed for two different scenarios. In the
first, the strategies are restricted to a fixed-gear structure (i.e., the decision variables
maintain their relative position as in 1995). In the second, the gear structure is unre-
stricted. Some determining aspects motivated the choice of these two particular sce-
narios. As far as negotiations are concerned, scenario 1 is clearly relevant. In fact,
this fishery involves a high number of countries using different combinations of
gears and, therefore, as recent ICCAT recommendations indicate, proportional allo-
5 The analysis uses the values for the number of fish at the starting period, catches, and fishing mortali-
ties for that year. There is no updating of information.
Figure 2. Retrospective Analysis of the ModelPintassilgo and Costa Duarte 56
cation is a relevant practice (ICCAT 1997). However, as other applied studies show,
there can be substantial improvements in the optimal payoffs by changing the gear
allocation (Campbell 1999). Due to the complex nature of the bluefin tuna fishery,
this is an important aspect. Therefore, a scenario with unrestricted gear structure is
also considered.
For both scenarios, constant and non-constant optimal strategies were estimated.
In the case of constant strategies, constant TAC and constant effort were considered6
— implemented through quota regulation and effort control, respectively.
For this, a non-linear constrained optimization problem is defined and solved
using Matlab programming. The optimization routine uses sequential quadratic pro-
gramming (SQP).7 In general terms, the non-linear optimization problem solved in












where the objective function, F(x), represents the TNPV of profits, and the vector of
decision variables (x) represents either the catch or fishing effort by gear. G(x) ≤  0
represent the equality and inequality constraints. In order to obtain results with
some empirical relevance, limits needed to be established for the expansion of some
of the gears, namely trap and remainder. Those limits were based on historical data.8
In the model, vlb and vub are two vectors of the lower and upper bounds of the vari-
ables.
Optimal Constant Management Strategies
East Atlantic
The optimal constant management strategies for each of the scenarios were esti-
mated, and the overall optimal strategies, in this case the constant effort, as well as
the corresponding payoffs, are presented in table 3. For the East stock, the following
gears are considered: longline (LL), purse seine (PS), trap, bait boat (BB), and re-
mainder (Rem).
As expected, in both scenarios a substantial increase in TNPV can be gained by
departing from the open-access to the optimal regulated strategies. Also, the results
show that gear structure is relevant for the overall value of this fishery.
In figures 3 and 4, catch and biomass simulation outcomes are shown for both
the optimal strategies and open access. The optimal strategies shown correspond to
the constant effort policy case. The graphs show that in the optimal regulated sce-
6 The optimal constant escapement (total biomass net of the harvest) was also estimated. As both the
initial levels of the Eastern and Western Atlantic stocks are very low, the optimal constant escapement is
severely constrained — making it a low payoff strategy. Thus, this strategy was not considered.
7 Constr – Optimization Toolbox (The Math Works, Inc.).
8 e.g., for the East Atlantic historical data reveals that, since the early 1970s, trap catches are below
5,000 MT and were at maximum historical value of 9,044 MT in 1965 (ICCAT 1995). Most of the traps
are concentrated around the Strait of Gibraltar and Southern Italy and may not be efficiently imple-
mented in other areas. Thus, a maximum of 10,000 MT was considered. The remainder category repre-
sents artisan gears, and, according to the historical data, 5,000 MT is a reasonable catch limit.Optimal Management of the Bluefin Tuna 57
narios, catches increase progressively as a result of the stock recovery. In open-ac-
cess, the sharp catch increase in the short-run leads to stock depletion. By compar-
ing scenarios 1 and 2, it is interesting to note that scenario 2 shows both higher
catches and better performance in terms of stock recovery throughout the forecast-
ing horizon. This clearly shows the importance of gear structure in the biological
dynamics of the model.9
As expected in a deterministic context, the constant effort strategy provides higher
NPV of profits than the constant TAC, as catches increase with stock recovery.
In scenario 1, the optimal TAC corresponds to 65% of the total catch in 1995
(25,706 MT), whereas the optimal constant effort policy results in a 50% effort reduc-
tion. The latter is more catch restrictive in the short-run (19,652 MT in 1996) but less in
the long-run (30,753 MT in 2020), due to the stock recovery. It is interesting to note that
in this scenario the optimal TAC is very close to ICCAT recommendations.10
Figure 3. Total Catch – Constant Strategies – East Atlantic
9 This can also be noted from the following two scenarios: if only longline is allowed to catch, the optimal
TAC is 33,157 MT and the biomass in 2020 is 829,040 MT. Allowing only bait boat, the optimal TAC is
11,818 MT, and the total biomass in 2020 is only 465,580 MT. So, longline with a much higher catch, is able
to better preserve the stock. Note that longline targets large bluefin, whereas bait boat targets small.
10 ICCAT recommends catch reductions of 25% of the 1994 or 1995 levels by the end of 1998. This corre-
sponds to catches of about 25,000 MT, a level that is considered as a sustainable catch and which would lead
spawning stock biomass (SSB) to increase to about three times the level of 1995 within 20 years.
Table 3
Optimal Strategy and Net Present Values – East Atlantic
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Open Access
E/E95 NPV E/E95 NPV NPV
LL 0.5 385.7 1.63 1,371.2 44.8
PS 0.5 281.1 0 0 27.5
Trap 0.5 266.7 1.50 997.9 –18.0
BB 0.5 22.5 0 0 –1.1
Rem 0.5 335.6 0.34 347.5 –45.7
Total 0.5 1,291.7 — 2,716.5 –7.6
Note: Values in 106 USD.Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte 58
In scenario 2, the optimal TAC allocation is to increase longline catches by
about 8%, relative to 1995 (12,849 MT), allow trap and remainder catches at their
upper bounds, and eliminate purse seine and bait boat. The optimal constant effort
presents a similar gear structure. At the optimal allocation, trap effort level is at the
upper bound (50% above the 95th level) and longline increases 63%, while remain-
der effort reduces to 34% of the 1995 level. The significant decrease for the remain-
der is a consequence of the restrictions imposed. Again, constant effort is more
catch restrictive in the short-run (24,738 MT in 1996) but less in the long-run
(44,618 MT in 2020).
Behind the optimal allocations results in scenario 2 are the differences in eco-
nomic efficiency and the different impact on the biological dynamics of the different
gears — as they target different age classes.
Trap is the gear that earns the highest price, as the fish suffer minimum damage.
According to Japanese data of imports, the artisan gears also receive a high price. In
this model, the traditional gears (trap and remainder) also present the highest stock
elasticity, as they are the gears that benefit the most from stock recovery. If there
were no bounds to the expansion of both these fleets, they would dominate any opti-
mal strategy. However, this result is not empirically reasonable, as both these fleets
are geographically restricted to a small area. It is then considered that they both will
be at the limit imposed.
Longline is economically more efficient than purse seine and bait boat, mainly
because it receives a much higher price — as it targets older age classes. Therefore,
significant economic gains can be obtained by this gear as the stock recovers.
Although purse seine is presently the dominant gear (a share close to 50% in re-
cent years), it is very damaging to the fish, which leads to prices substantially lower
than those received by the longliners, even for the same age classes. Bait boat, used
mainly in the Bay of Biscay, catches small bluefin tuna, which is not demanded by
the Japanese market, and so does not represent a significant economic value.
This result is in accordance with previous studies on tuna fisheries, where simi-
lar reallocation strategies are suggested (Campbell and Nicholl 1995; Campbell
1999). In particular, they suggest contraction of purse seine, which is the prevailing
gear, and the expansion of longline.
In this study, the criterion used to select the optimal policy is only TNPV. None-
theless, by considering issues such as unemployment costs, stochasticity, or decreas-
ing demand function, the relative position between constant TAC and constant effort
could change. In fact, the optimal constant effort is more restrictive than the optimal
TAC in the short-run, leading to a greater negative impact in short-run unemploy-
ment. Another limiting factor frequently mentioned for the constant effort policy is
Figure 4. Total Biomass – Constant Strategies – East AtlanticOptimal Management of the Bluefin Tuna 59
that real enforcement is more difficult to implement. In fact, in the presence of eco-
nomic incentives in the fishery, the units of effort might be used more intensively,
therefore undermining regulations. However, this problem could be avoided if the
constant effort is implemented not by effort control but by quota regulation, where
the quotas correspond to the constant effort (as in Steinshamn 1998).
The results might also be affected by considering a recruitment function with
regular cycles, or allowing for a stochastic recruitment function. This has implica-
tions in terms of whether constant catch or constant effort yields the highest ex-
pected profit (Hannesson and Steinshamn 1991) and on the mean and variation in
size of the fish stocks and net revenues (Steinshamn 1998).
In determining optimal policy, Kennedy (1999) considers both consumer and
producer surplus in the objective function. This criterion could also have impact on
the ranking of the policies. Note that in the short run, a decrease in catches implies a
decrease in consumer surplus. Therefore, in terms of consumer surplus, the constant
TAC policy is preferable to the constant effort in the short run.
West Atlantic
In this section, an optimization analysis similar to that of the East Atlantic is pre-
sented for the West Atlantic. It is worth mentioning that the two stocks present sig-
nificant differences in the dimension, gears used, and targeted age classes. In the
West, the stock has been severely depleted for over a decade, and the economic
value of the overall fishery is smaller.
For the Western stock, four gears are considered: longline (LL), purse seine
(PS), rod and reel (RR), and remainder (Rem). As the remainder represents mainly
the artisan gears, which present natural growing constraints, upper bounds were also
defined.11
The optimal strategies obtained, as well as the corresponding TNPV, are shown
in table 4. As in the East Atlantic, the constant effort case yields higher TNPV than
TAC, for both scenarios, and there are substantial gains in departing from open-ac-
cess to an optimal regulated policy. The catch and biomass evolution for the optimal
strategies (constant effort) in both scenarios and the open-access is very similar to
the East Atlantic case, qualitatively.
For this stock, the optimal TAC for scenario 1 is about 87% of 1995 catch
(1,980 MT), and the optimal effort levels are reduced by 34%. As in the East Atlan-
tic, restricting effort is the optimal constant policy, although it is more catch restric-
tive in the short run (1,739 MT in 1996) and less in the long run (2,087 MT in
2020).
In scenario 2, the optimal strategy is to expand purse seine substantially and al-
low the remainder to fish at the upper bound. Note that in the West fishery, the purse
seine is both economically and biologically more efficient than the longline, which
explains this result. In this strategy, the increase in the purse seine catches12 would
bring the gear catches up to the levels that existed before the regulations of 1982
(e.g., 2,320 MT in 1975), when it was one of the dominant gears. This expansion in
purse seine contrasts with results obtained for the East Atlantic, in which purse seine
is eliminated. This is due to the different features of this gear on both sides of the
Atlantic, namely in terms of age class target. In the West Atlantic, purse seine tar-
11 The remainder category was restricted: 500 MT in the TAC case and 0% effort increase in the constant
effort case.
12 From 249 MT in 1995 to 1,897 in 1996 and 2,144 MT in 2020, in the constant effort case.Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte 60
gets giant bluefin tuna, whereas in the East Atlantic, it also targets small specimens.
It is also interesting to note that in 1997 the shares of total catch (ICCAT 1998)
were {18%, 12%, 53%, 17%} for longline, purse seine, rod and reel (+ sport), and
remainder, respectively. One reason behind such a large gap between the present
gear structure of catches and the optimal one, is that the former does not represent
the relative economic efficiency of the different gears, as catches are highly regu-
lated. In fact, criteria such as fairness and equity, as well as the ease of monitoring
catches, are behind the present allocation.13 The high value of the other gears, re-
garding recreational benefits and employment relative to purse seine, is also argued.
In the West Atlantic, as in the East, ICCAT’s catch recommendations (2,200 MT
for 1995–96 and 2,354 MT for 1997–98) are close to the optimal TAC obtained, es-
pecially in the second scenario (2,397 MT).
Optimal Management under Non-constant Strategies
Herein, the extension of optimal management of bluefin tuna to non-constant strate-
gies is explored.
The optimization for non-constant strategies usually raises a set of troublesome
issues. As stated in Kennedy (1992), the optimal annual harvest profiles for multi-
cohort fisheries tend to be highly irregular, particularly for the initial years. This
phenomenon is referred to as periodic fishing, or pulse fishing in the extreme case
where zero fishing alternates with high levels of fishing.
For the bioeconomic model presented in this paper, the optimization routines
used do not converge to a single annual sequence of TACs or levels of fishing effort.
The length of the time horizon, together with the complexity of the bioeconomic dy-
namics, is clearly behind this result.
In order to overcome this problem, the range of the decision variables was re-
stricted by imposing reasonable upper limits. This can be seen as an appropriate pro-
cedure, as the management of Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna, like most straddling
and highly migratory species, aims not only to achieve optimal management of the
stock, but also its conservation. Furthermore, the UN Agreement relating to the con-
servation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks empha-
sizes the importance of precautionary limits on catches (Tahindro 1999). In a con-
13 For more details on the allocation of catches see, “Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Regu-
latory Amendment for The Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fishery” (U.S. Department of Commerce
1995).
Table 4
Optimal Strategy and Net Present Values — West Atlantic
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Open Access
E/E95 NPV E/E95 NPV NPV
LL 0.76 16.1 0 0 –1.3
PS 0.76 5.8 7.4 61.6 0.2
RR 0.76 24.3 0 0 –1.6
Rem 0.76 21.1 1.0 32.4 –1.0
Total 0.76 67.3 — 94.0 –3.7
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text of worldwide over-fishing, the UN Agreement provides “Guidelines for the ap-
plication of precautionary reference points in the conservation and management of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.” In particular, it refers to
conservation or limit reference points, which set boundaries intended to constrain
harvesting to safe biological limits, so that the stocks can produce maximum sus-
tainable yield (MSY).
A significant difference, as compared with the case of constant strategies, is that
for equivalent upper limits, the optimal sequence of annual TACs is equivalent to
the optimal sequence of annual levels of fishing effort. As the TAC is presently the most
common policy instrument used in fishery management worldwide, the optimal annual
sequence of TACs for bluefin tuna was analyzed for both the East and West Atlantic.
Assume a constant gear structure, as in the base year (scenario 1). In this sec-
tion, the TAC is considered to be variable during the first 25 years, thus the simula-
tion period was extended to 50 periods in order to avoid bias for the values of the
latest TACs towards the upper limits. The TAC is considered to be variable during
the first 25 years and constant thereafter.14
East Atlantic
In the optimization procedure, a precautionary limit on annual catches of 40,000 MT
is considered.15 In this framework, the optimal policy is now to declare an initial
harvest moratorium of five periods and harvest 40,000 MT thereafter. The optimal
TAC and the stock evolution for the first 25 periods are presented in figure 5.
As this figure shows, the optimal policy results in a significant stock recovery,
although lower than in the constant strategy case. The progressive trend of the stock
towards stabilization after initial recovery suggests that 40,000 MT is, for the par-
ticular level and composition of the stock after the moratorium, close to a maximum
sustainable catch.
Regarding TNPV, this non-constant policy yields 1,580.1 million USD in the first
25 years, which is about 22% higher than the TNPV in the optimal constant policy.
In order to evaluate the role of the discount rate in the results, 10% and 20%
discount rates are also considered. With these rates, the optimal policy is similar, but
with a shorter harvest moratorium: four and three periods, respectively. It is, none-
theless, worth noting that this occurs under conservation restrictions. In their ab-
sence, high discount rates imply optimal policies, which lead the stock to depletion.
West Atlantic
As for the East Atlantic, the optimal policy is determined, and a precautionary limit
on catches of 2,500 MT is considered.16 The optimal policy is to declare a four-pe-
riod moratorium, catch 1,300 MT in the fifth period, and 2,500 MT thereafter —
14 Thus, 26 variables are optimized: the TAC for the first 25 years and the constant TAC for the last 25
years. Among other formulation options, this particular one was selected as it not only solves the bias of
the last periods, but also accounts for the impact on the stock dynamics of the harvest during the first 25
periods. Another option would be to consider the value of the variables in the 25th period to remain con-
stant thereafter. This formulation, although extending the analysis to an infinite time horizon, does not
capture the dynamics of the model after the 25th period.
15 Historical data show that catches above this limit tend to lead biomass to depletion.
16 The model simulations show that, with the present gear mix, 2,500 MT is close to a maximum sustain-
able catch, following a stock recovery through an initial harvest moratorium.Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte 62
with the exception of 25th period (200 MT ).17 The TAC and the stock evolution are
represented in figure 6. The TNPV for the first 25 years is 75.4 million USD, which
is 12% higher than in the optimal constant policy.
By considering different discount rates, it can be concluded that the optimal
policy is not sensitive to this parameter. In fact, for 10% and 20% discount rates, the
optimal policy is to declare a harvest moratorium of three and two years, respec-
tively, and catch 2,500 MT thereafter.
What would be the impact of extending the optimization from constant strate-
gies to non-constant strategies in scenario 2? In order to address this question, addi-
tional restrictions would have to be imposed; otherwise, the model would not con-
verge. A scenario was considered in which the decision variables are not only the annual
TACs, but also the share of each gear used. It is assumed that there are precautionary
limits on harvest and that the gear shares remain constant through time, which is
equivalent to an instantaneous adjustment to a permanent optimal gear structure.
Figure 5. Optimal TAC and Stock Evolution – Non constant Strategies – East Atlantic
Figure 6. Optimal TAC and Stock Evolution – Non constant Strategies – West Atlantic
17 As it is assumed that the TAC is constant from t = 26 to t = 50, the optimal path calls for a TAC de-
crease at t = 25 in order to allow for a higher initial stock for the remaining periods.Optimal Management of the Bluefin Tuna 63
In this setting, the optimization results for both the East and the West Atlantic,
indicate that the optimal permanent gear structure is exactly the same as in the con-
stant case. Namely for the East Atlantic, trap and remainder reach their natural lim-
its; whereas, the remaining share corresponds to the longline gear. Furthermore, as
in the case of constant strategies, there are substantial gains by reallocating gear
shares to an optimal structure. Therefore, it can be concluded that, as far as the im-
portance of the gear structure is concerned, the simpler scenario of constant strate-
gies is able to capture the main features of the problem.
Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that through the use of a multi-gear, age-structured bioeconomic
model, important aspects of the optimal strategies for a complex fishery, such as
bluefin tuna, can be captured.
In order to assess the importance of the gear structure in this fishery, two opti-
mization scenarios were considered: one in which the strategies are restricted to the
gear mix of the base year, and the other where strategies are unrestricted.
The optimization for constant strategies in the two scenarios, shows that the
policy of regulating effort yields higher payoff than the optimal TAC. It is also con-
cluded that there are substantial gains by departing from open-access to an optimal
regulated scenario. In the restricted gear structure scenario, the optimal strategy is a
significant effort reduction for both the East (50%) and West Atlantic (34%).
As expected, the gear structure of the fishery proved to be highly relevant re-
garding optimal payoffs. In particular, the unrestricted strategies yield rents substan-
tially higher than restricted ones. Behind this result are important bioeconomic in-
teractions among the different gears, as they present very different economic effi-
ciencies and target different age classes.
The optimal results imply dramatic changes in the gear structure of the fishery.
In particular, for the East Atlantic the optimal effort strategy is to increase longline
by 63%, allow traps to expand up to their natural limit, decrease remainder by 66%,
and virtually eliminate purse seine and bait boat.
The results suggest that the present gear structure of catches, in both the East
and West Atlantic, is far from optimal. This remains valid by extending the optimi-
zation to non-constant strategies. In this case, the optimal management of both
stocks calls for an initial harvest moratorium and catches at precautionary limits
thereafter.
Possible extensions of the model include: introducing stochastic fluctuations
(e.g., in the recruitment function), setting gear prices by age class, and estimating
demand functions.
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Catch at Age by Gear
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N No. of Fish (Beginning of Year) M Instantaneous Natural Mortality
Ñ Estimated No. Fish (Beginning of 1995) Mat Maturity Rate
SRR Stock Recruitment Relation W Average Weight
SSB Spawning Stock Biomass q Production Function Parameter
F Instantaneous Fishing Mortality α Catch-Stock Elasticity
Fmax Fishing Mort. at Maximum Selectivity wg Costs Parameter
B Total Biomass γ Crew Share
Sel Selectivity r Interest Rate
CN Catch Numbers β Effort Adjustment Parameter
CB Catch Biomass Π b Profit Bound
E Effort h Exit Condition Parameter
C Catch
Rev Revenue Indices
Cost Cost j Stock (j = East Atl., West Atl.)
P Average Price t Time (t = 1,…,T), T = 25 (2020)
Π Profit a Age (a = 1,…,9,A), A = 10+
TNPV Total Net Present Value s Gear (s = 1,2,…,S)
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